The wars over the war A new government gets to grips with another foreign-policy priority

The wars over the war

A new government gets to grips with another foreign-policy priority

 

IT IS no longer Helmandshire, that corner of distant Afghanistan that was, for a while, a British dominion. For much of the past four years, since an underpowered British force started slugging it out with the Taliban, Helmand has been a British military obsession: troops were rotated in and out and commanders’ reputations made and broken, while advisers cajoled dubious officials and wily tribal elders.
Events elsewhere in the country were of little importance to the British in their bloodied fief. But as the Taliban insurgency gathered strength, ever more American troops were sent to help the beleaguered British forces. There are now 20,000 Americans in Helmand, compared with about 8,000 Britons. As was inevitable, this week the British were more or less subsumed into the larger American force.
An American marine general, Richard Mills, has been given direct command of Helmand and the neighbouring province of Nimruz, a chunk carved out of Regional Command (RC) South and now known as RC South-West. British officials say such tinkering is an unimportant part of life in military coalitions; in any case the British will retake command of RC South-West in a year, and a British general, Nick Carter, still commands RC South.
Yet it is hard to escape the conclusion that the war is now mainly an American show, with the British playing a side role. To British critics of the war, this is the time to start withdrawing British forces after the loss of 290 men and women, and the maiming of hundreds more, for little obvious gain. The Dutch and Canadians are already preparing to leave, and America itself has promised to start drawing down troops from July 2011.
For a brief moment, the coalition government led by David Cameron seemed to be toying with the idea of getting out faster. On the eve of a trip to Afghanistan with other cabinet colleagues last month, Liam Fox, the defence secretary, talked of wanting to “reset expectations and timelines”. “We are not a global policeman,” he told an interviewer. “We are not in Afghanistan for the sake of the education policy in a broken 13th-century country.”
On June 1st Mr Cameron summoned senior ministers, military officers and officials from his new National Security Council to discuss Afghanistan at Chequers, his country retreat. Among the guests were notable sceptics of the war strategy such as Rory Stewart—a new Tory MP who was successively an army officer, diplomat, occupation official in Iraq and, latterly, charity organiser in Afghanistan. Mr Stewart laboured long and unsuccessfully to convince the administration of President Barack Obama to opt for a “light footprint” in Afghanistan, focusing mainly on counter-terrorist operations. Mr Obama chose instead to “surge”.
Did Mr Stewart have more luck with the British prime minister? The answer, it seems, is no. Officials said the Chequers meeting was not a “review” of policy, but only a “seminar” intended to “take stock”. Mr Cameron, it is said, told the gathering that his government was not about to change course, and would support America’s war. On the same day, the prime minister called the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, for what officials say was a “warm” talk about the “peace jirga” being held in Kabul, and about preparations for military operations in Kandahar.
British qualms about the war—a poll by Com Res in April found that 77% of the British public wanted troops withdrawn from Afghanistan—take second place to Mr Cameron’s desire to forge close ties with the Obama administration. That message will delight Robert Gates, the American defence secretary, who will be visiting London to meet members of the new government before a NATO meeting in Brussels on June 10th and 11th.
The American commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, is due to submit in December the results of a review that will set out how far and how quickly NATO can start drawing down forces next year. Barring a political or military disaster, British officials are assuming that, regardless of how many provinces “transition” to nominal Afghan control in the coming months, a substantial number of foreign troops will remain in Afghanistan until about 2014.
It may be a sign of the prevailing mood in Whitehall that rumours are now circulating about the possible demise of Sir Jock Stirrup, the chief of the defence staff, perhaps in favour of the Afghanophile army chief, General Sir David Richards. Behind the scenes, General Richards has promoted the idea that British troops should move from Helmand to Kandahar province. Kandahar, Afghanistan’s second-largest city and the Taliban’s ideological fount, has always seemed to ambitious British officers a more prestigious property than Helmand. The departure of the Canadian contingent next year would create the opening for the British to move in, play a central role in the next phase of the war, maximise Britain’s influence with the Americans and, perhaps, retain a permanent command for the British.
Such ideas, though, seem to have been blocked at the top. Britain has invested heavily in military infrastructure, and in developing contacts and intelligence sources in Helmand. As Dr Fox put it: “It would be crazy to go somewhere else and start all over again.”